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1. Introduction and Project Objectives 
  
3 
Transportation agencies across the United States are faced with the challenge of effectively 
adapting infrastructure to withstand the predicted effects of climate change. This challenge is 
magnified by a nationwide funding shortage, uncertainty about impacts, and a limited (but 
growing) body of information regarding best practices. The literature on transportation 
infrastructure adaptation is weak in terms of strategies for undertaking improved planning. The 
work presented here seeks to help fill that gap. This report discusses research efforts and 
presents findings regarding the influence of transportation governance structures and 
mechanisms on infrastructure adaptation to climate change. This work is a continuation of 
research that began in 2009 as part of our ongoing efforts in climate change resiliency through 
the Research on Adaptation to Climate Change (RACC) project. Several different research 
topics and methodologies have contributed to the results. 
  
Due to the varied nature of the research undertaken on this subject, this report is organized by 
specific projects and papers. While some have a fairly unique focus, others share a significant 
amount of overlap. The interdisciplinary nature of this research aligns well with the complex 
system spire’s emphasis on social complexity, and it also is well aligned with the UVM TRC’s 
focus on network resiliency, adaptive governance, and climate change.  
  
Over the past two years, our work on this subject, with the support of the UVM TRC, has 
resulted in the creation of one database, five papers in various stages of acceptance and/or 
review at peer-reviewed journals, one grant proposal, and  two conference presentations (at the 
2015 Annual Meeting of the Transportation Research Board and the 2015 Conference of the 




















2. Database: Bridge Funding in Vermont and Maine, 2000-2015 
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Although this database has not been published, it is currently accessible for use by the UVM 
TRC and associated researchers. The database was first constructed by TRC GRA Tiyasha De 
Pinto; Anna Schulz expanded the database and revised/updated some earlier work for 
accuracy.  
 
2.1 Background  
 
While many transportation agencies are beginning to discuss the importance of adapting 
infrastructure to climate change, it is unclear whether funding is actually being allocated for that 
purpose. Both to help calibrate models and provide a snapshot of funding priorities, we 
constructed a database that has entries for every planned bridge project undertaken in Vermont 




The first step in building this database was the acquisition of funding documents for the states 
involved. For Vermont, the most detailed funding documents proved to be yearly Capital 
Programs published by VTrans. For Maine, the Capital Programs lacked detail about project 
funding breakdown, so Statewide Transportation Improvement Programs were used instead. 
The two plan types are closely related yet do have distinct differences: Capital Programs are 
more representative of the budget, while STIPs are a plan for committing federal funds. Capital 
Programs also tend to operate on the state fiscal year, while STIPs align with the federal fiscal 
year. In the case of both plan types, specific projects often fall behind schedule or are delayed 
for another year. As a result, some projects can reappear in plans for several consecutive years 
even if they are not actually active, which leads to funds being overcounted. Capital Programs 
are also produced annually, while STIPs are produced biennially. 
         
The Capital Programs and STIPs were used to build a project database that included all 
available information about a given project. For the purposes of this research, only bridge and 
culvert projects were included. VTrans divides its projects into specific programs: those projects 
belonging to the “Interstate Bridges”, “State Highway Bridges”, and “Town Highway Bridges” 
categories were included in the database. For plans produced in 2006 and later, maintenance 
projects were segregated into a separate “Bridge Maintenance” category; those were included 
as well. 
 
MaineDOT does not subdivide bridge projects into program classes as neatly as VTrans. While 
Maine STIPs do include a “Bridge Replacement and Rehabilitation” funding source category, 
many additional bridge projects are typically funded through other sources, such as “Interstate 
Maintenance.” To create a database comparable to the assembled for Vermont, Maine projects 
were selected if their descriptions explicitly stated that they were bridge or culvert projects. 
Bridge or culvert projects that were listed as part of another, larger project were not included 
due to the inability to determine how much funding was allocated to the different portions of the 
project. Because STIPs are only produced every two years, odd years typically include fewer 
projects. Several project listings contained discrepancies between funding allocation 
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breakdowns and projects totals, many of which were considered to be clerical errors. For those 
projects, the totals were updated to reflect the sum of the allocated funding sources.  
 
The resulting database has an entry for every bridge or culvert project that has appeared in 
Vermont Capital Programs or Maine STIPs in the past fifteen years, complete with all available 
funding data, location information, and a brief description.  
 
2.3 Results and conclusions 
 
Given that this is a database, the results and conclusions depend largely on context and method 
of analysis. At the broadest level, Vermont is steadily investing more into bridges, while Maine 
has seen much more sporadic investment.  
  
3. Paper: The emergence of attractors under multi-level institutional designs: agent-
based modeling of intergovernmental decision making for funding transportation 
projects 
 
This paper was published in the international journal AI & Society: Knowledge, Culture, and 
Communication (published online 11 December, 2013). Asim Zia and Chris Koliba authored the 




In multi-level governance networks, policy systems are influenced by varying distributions of 
power and authority among federal, state, regional, and local levels. To better understand the 
theory and practice around governance relative to the field of transportation, we undertake the 
following research question: how do intergovernmental institutional rules set by federal, state, 
and regional government agencies generate and sustain basins of attraction in funding 
infrastructure projects? Modeling these arrangements and associated factors has the potential 
to reveal patterns regarding socioeconomic and infrastructure development. In this paper, we 
introduce our work on a pattern-oriented, agent-based model (ABM) that was developed to 
simulate real-life transportation policy implementation processes at the federal, state, regional, 
and local levels. The ABM compares a baseline governmental scenario with alternative 
structures (based on the use of different rules) and examines how that influences finances. 
Calibrating the ABM required inputting data gathered from focus groups, interviews, and 
analysis of current policies and programs. In this paper, we used the ABM to focus on how 
different power and authority structures between transportation actors (including government at 




Multiple steps--from gathering data to building the model--were required to obtain the results 
published in this paper.  
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3.2.1 Data collection 
 
We conducted both in-depth interviews and focus groups with a number of stakeholders, 
including local government officials, CCRPC (MPO) staff and board members, staff from other 
Vermont RPCs, Vermont Agency of Transportation (VTrans) officials, Federal Highway 
Association (FHWA) representatives, USDOT officials, federal and state senate office 
representatives, and local nonprofits and NGOs. Both the focus groups and the interviews were 
recorded and transcribed, then analyzed for relevant themes.  
 
To better understand how roadway projects are selected, we acquired project prioritization 
procedures for the state, the MPO, and other RPCs. Because transportation funding is 
increasingly limited, in any given year there are far too many potential projects to actually fund, 
so states and MPOs are forced to prioritize the most important ones. Each state does this 
differently. Vermont’s project prioritization procedures can be found in Table 1, below. After 
acquiring the project prioritization procedures, we assessed all of Vermont’s Capital Programs 
from 1998-2011. Capital Programs, which are essentially to-do lists, include all of the projects 
that have been prioritized and selected for funding. We pulled the roadway projects out of each 
year’s Capital Program and created a funding database (like the bridge funding database 
described earlier in this document). This database enabled us to compare the observed 
priorities with the stated prioritization procedures and to look at funding patterns across space 
and time.  
 





3.2.2 Structuring the ABM 
 
The ABM was structured to simulate the intergovernmental decision-making processes that 
result in project funding. The ABM, which is pattern-oriented, generates emergent patterns 
based on the Capital Program database. It has a nested scheme: a state agent contains ten 
nested RPCs, which collectively contain 600 nested municipalities, which contain transportation 
projects as their own agent class. USDOT is modeled as a dummy parameter due to the fact 
that (a) it allocates funds but is not involved in prioritizing projects; and (b) we are focused on 
the state scale. The user can modify the parameter to indicate how much funding is available in 
a given year. Figure 1 displays the structure of the ABM. Twenty-seven different input 
parameters were used to calibrate the model. Most of those parameters have uniform or 
triangular probability distributions, meaning that the model is stochastic and its base and each 
run is a unique realization chosen from the random probability distributions. The ABM calculates 
yearly resource flows from the state to smaller jurisdictions. 
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Figure 1. Internal structure of the ABM 
 
 
3.2.3 Experimental Simulations 
 
We ran the model for six different experimental scenarios. These scenarios and their weighting 
systems are outlined in Table 2. Scenario 1, the baseline scenario, gave relatively little weight to 
regional priority compared to Scenario 2, which approximated an alternative intergovernmental 
institutional design that focused much more on regionalization than on highway system 
condition. Scenario 3 weighted cost effectiveness very heavily, while Scenario 4 had a high 
percentage of funded projects. Scenario 5 reduced federal funding and Scenario 6 was 
indicative of a situation in which exogenous shocks like floods raised the number of new 
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(cost-effective) 
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Scenario 4 (funding 
flux) 
0.2 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.3 30 
Scenario 5 
(sequestration) 
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3.3 Results and Conclusions 
 
Despite the differences between the differences between scenarios, there were consistently 
some RPCs that attracted relatively large funding amounts, indicating basins of attraction. We 
identified two major patterns: first, the ABM is very tied to the exogenous parameter of funding 
availability. Second, there is variability in the success rate across the scenarios and those 
differences may point to equity and efficiency trade-offs in policy outcomes.  
 
The scenario runs enabled us to make a few preliminary conclusions. First, if regional 
considerations are weighted more heavily, a phase change will result, meaning that the basins 
of attraction will switch. Second, shifting power from state to regional governments may result in 
a more equitable regional funding distribution. Changes in the institutional design cause major 
changes in which towns receive funding for which projects.  
 
While this paper focuses on modeling and thereby presents an abstraction of reality, there are 
important implications from this work. Notably, our experimental simulations using the ABM 
indicate that the current institutional configuration of state and regional-level governments 
generates basins of attraction in funding for transportation infrastructure. Additionally, these 
basins privilege certain towns and regions over others, and that level of privilege can increase 
under certain scenarios (including funding sequestration and exogenous shocks). While 
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weighting the cost effectiveness of projects may not shift the basins, weighting regional priorities 
may indeed do so. As such, various actors may be able to alter institutional structures to modify 
the basins of attraction and subsequently shift funding allocations.  
 
In further research, the ABM may be extended beyond the “roadway” project to include others, 
such as the “bridges” class. GIS could also be incorporated to make the model more spatially 
explicit. We hope to extend the model to additional states pending the incorporation of additional 




4. Paper: Establishing Performance Priorities: Regional Variation and the Role of 
Collaborative Capacity in MPOs 
 
This paper is under review at the journal Urban Affairs Review. Asim Zia, Chris Koliba, Jack 




Emergent governance networks pose unique performance management challenges. In the 
transportation field, federal and state governments, which provide sustaining base funding to 
smaller governance networks, are faced with the difficulty of monitoring performance to 
appropriately allocate funds. In this paper, we analyze responses from a 2009 Government 
Accountability Office survey of all 380 Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) in the 
United States. We use the data to test two hypotheses:  
 
(1) Both the administrative and collaborative capacities of MPOs and network organizations 
affect MPO prioritization of performance measures; and 
 
(2) Various complex contextual factors, such as the size of the population served by the MPO 
and whether it is located in a multi-state area and/or an air quality non-attainment district, affect 
the selection of which performance measures are used: MPOs across the United States do not 
assign equal weights to performance measures.  
 
MPOs are major actors in planning and executing transportation plans and policies. In various 
regions, they are structured differently and have unique relationships to regional governance 
networks. Fragmented institutional governance structures have, at times, resulted in reduced 
collective action and collaboration. There is increasing interest in how collaboration influences 
the definition of performance measures, the collection of performance data, and the integration 
of that data into organizational management. MPOs provide one avenue through which to 





4.2.1 Data Collection 
 
This study relies on data from a 2009 GAO survey of all 381 MPOs in the US. The 45-question 
survey had an 85% response rate and is available to the public online. The survey was taken by 
MPO directors or their designees and asks about factors that shape MPO structure and 
function. Table 3 provides an overview of the variables examine in the survey as well as the 
mean scores among respondents and the standard deviation.  
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
 















Contextual complexity variables       
TMA urban (>200K)  CC1 327 .00 1.00 .45 .498 
Multi-state area  CC2 327 .00 1.00 .12 .328 
Located within an air quality non-
attainment or maintenance area 
CC3 328 .00 1.00 .50 .501 
Air quality non-Attainment area and 
<200K 
CC1*CC3 327 .00 1.00 .3242 .4687 
Administrative structure variables       
Independent organization AS1 328 .00 1.00 .18 .385 
Part of a regional council/council of 
governments 
AS2 328 .00 1.00 .38 .486 
Part of a county government AS3 326 .00 1.00 .1319 .3389 
Part of a city government office AS4 326 .00 1.00 .1902 .393 
Descriptive performance measures 
variables 
      
Project implementation  DPM1 310 .00 1.00 .4323 .4961 
Travel demand model accuracy DPM2 297 .00 1.00 .2357 .4251 
Transportation system safety  DPM3 310 .00 1.00 .4613 .4993 
Transportation system reliability DPM4 307 .00 1.00 .4430 .4975 
Transportation system accessibility  DPM5 310 .00 1.00 .4419 .4974 
Transportation system security  DPM6 301 .00 1.00 .1561 .3636 
Compliance with federal and state rules  DPM7 320 .00 1.00 .7938 .4052 
Satisfaction among local stakeholders  DPM8 315 .00 1.00 .8540 .3537 
Satisfaction among general public  DPM9 317 .00 1.00 .6593 .4746 
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Extent of coordination and stakeholder 
involvement  
DPM10 319 .00 1.00 .6771 .4683 
Measure of public participation  DPM11 317 .00 1.00 .4606 .4992 
Level of highway congestion  DPM12 311 .00 1.00 .5209 .5003 
Air quality  DPM13 282 .00 1.00 .3723 .4842 
Mobility for disadvantaged populations  DPM14 311 .00 1.00 .4309 .4960 
Condition of transportation network  DPM15 314 .00 1.00 .4873 .5006 
Normative performance measure variables       
Project implementation  NPM1 324 .00 1.00 .7222 .4486 
Travel demand model accuracy  NPM2 318 .00 1.00 .5818 .4940 
Transportation system safety  NPM3 323 .00 1.00 .7523 .4323 
Transportation system reliability  NPM4 320 .00 1.00 .7344 .4423 
Transportation system accessibility  NPM5 319 .00 1.00 .7179 .4507 
Transportation system security  NPM6 310 .00 1.00 .4032 .4913 
Compliance with federal and state rules  NPM7 323 .00 1.00 .7121 .4535 
Satisfaction among local stakeholders  NPM8 319 .00 1.00 .9216 .2691 
Satisfaction among general public  NPM9 319 .00 1.00 .8715 .3352 
Extent of coordination and stakeholder 
involvement  
NPM10 320 .00 1.00 .8031 .3982 
Measure of public participation  NPM11 319 .00 1.00 .6928 .4620 
Level of highway congestion  NPM12 317 .00 1.00 .7161 .4516 
Air quality  NPM13 285 .00 1.00 .5368 .4995 
Mobility for disadvantaged population  NPM14 318 .00 1.00 .7516 .4327 
Condition of transportation network  NPM15 314 .00 1.00 .7803 .4147 
Collaborative capacity variables        
Stakeholder representation on MPO 
Board 
COC1 328 .00 12.00 4.5122 2.5425 
External collaborative capacity COC2 328 .00 100.00 44.7866 21.9686 
Technical capacity variables       
In-house capacity for generating travel 
forecasts 
TC1 328 .00 1.00 .4451 .4977 
Using a travel demand model TC2 328 .00 1.00 .9360 .2451 
Capacity challenge variables       
Lack of funding CCH1 326 .00 4.00 2.6840 1.1508 
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Competing priorities CCH2 322 .00 4.00 1.9752 1.1731 
Obtaining public input CCH3 321 .00 4.00 2.2991 1.0417 
Lack of flexibility CCH4 317 .00 4.00 1.8486 1.2638 
Lack of ability to find local match CCH5 324 .00 4.00 2.2006 1.3213 
Fiscal constraints CCH6 327 .00 4.00 2.5719 1.1378 
Limited authority CCH7 312 .00 4.00 2.3942 1.0914 
Limitations in TDM capacity CCH8 317 .00 4.00 1.7634 1.0984 
Data limitations CCH9 321 .00 4.00 2.0436 1.0237 
Coordination with land-use agencies CCH10 321 .00 4.00 1.6168 1.0721 
Coordination with other regions CCH11 311 .00 4.00 1.0161 .9348 
Coordination with state DOT CCH12 326 .00 4.00 1.4448 1.1156 
Lack of trained staff CCH13 322 .00 4.00 1.5497 1.1269 
 
 
4.2.2 Variables and Operationalization 
 
We focused on questions that offered insight relative to three main areas: (1) performance, (2) 
contextual complexity, and (3) collaborative capacity. With respect to performance, we 
examined questions regarding:  
·         The MPO’s current use and valuation of performance measures, 
·         The level of importance MPO directors ascribe to certain performance measures, and 
·         The MPO’s level of technical and collaborative capacity.  
 
With respect to contextual complexity and collaborative capacity, we coded the questions for the 
following five variables:  
·         Contextual complexity, 
·         Administrative structures, 
·         Descriptive and normative performance measures, 
·         Collaborative and technical capacities, and 
·         Capacity challenges.  
 
We developed logistic regression models that use contextual complexity, administrative 
structure, technical capacity, collaborative capacity, and capacity challenges as independent 




Figure 2. Logistic regression model design 
 
Respondent prioritization of 15 performance measures (descriptive and normative) were used 
as binary response variables in 30 binomial logistic regression models.  
 
4.3 Results and Conclusions 
 
We found that both the size of a community in which and MPO is located and the collaborative 
capacity of an MPO both have significant effects on the choice of performance measures. 
Technical capacity and administrative structures exert influence as well, as do additional 
capacity challenges such as lack of funding and shortage of staff. In our analysis we focused on 
descriptive performance measures in an effort to consider actual MPO practices, rather than 
perceptions about desirable performance measures.  
 
For our first hypothesis, which posited that administrative and collaborative capacity both 
influence which performance measures an MPO selects, we examined both internal and 
external collaborative capacity. For the internal component, we found that as stakeholder 
representation on an MPO board increases, they are more likely to prioritize the condition of the 
transportation network as a performance measure and less likely to prioritize satisfaction among 
local stakeholders. External collaboration also exerts influence over the prioritization of 
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performance measures. To be more precise, we found that as an MPO’s collborative capacity 
increases by 1%, that MPO is: 
- 1% more likely to prioritize the condition of the transportation network and transportation 
system accessibility;  
- 2% more likely to project implementation, transportation system safety, transportation 
system reliability, air quality, mobility for disadvantaged populations, compliance with 
federal and state rules, satisfaction amongst the general public, and measure of public 
participation;  
- 3% more likely to travel demand model accuracy, transportation system security, and 
extent of coordination and stakeholder involvement; and  
- 4% more likely to prioritize satisfaction among local stakeholders.  
 
These findings enable us to confirm our first hypothesis.  
 
Our second hypothesis was that complex contextual factors influence an MPO‘s selection of  
performance measures and that MPOs across the US weight measures differently. We 
employed small to medium sized MPOs in air quality attainment areas as the base group. 
Relative to that group, large (greater than 200,000 people) MPOS in air quality attainment areas 
are:  
 
- 62% less likely to prioritize project implementation; 65 % less likely to prioritize 
transportation system safety; 
- 67% less likely to prioritize transportation system accessibility; 
- 65% less likely to prioritize the extent of coordination and stakeholder involvement and 
- 68% less likely to prioritize the condition of the transportation network as performance 
measures. 
 
In air quality non-attainment areas, small- or medium-sized MPOs are, relative to their air quality 
attainment counterparts:  
- 56% less likely to prioritize project implementation; 
- 61% less likely to prioritize mobility for disadvantaged populations; 
- 142% more likely to prioritize level of highway congestion; and 
- 1417% more likely to prioritize air quality as performance measures.  
 
These findings allow us to confirm our second hypothesis: size and other contextual factors 
influence the prioritization of performance measures.  
 
Finally, we also examined the effect of MPO capacity on administrative challenges. Table 4 







Table 4. MPO capacity challenges and implications 
 
MPO Capacity Challenge Priority Implication 
MPOs with in-house 
capacity for generating 
travel forecasts are:  
56% less likely to prioritize satisfaction among the general public   
43% less likely to prioritize the level of highway congestion as performance 
measures 
MPO’s listing lack of 
funding as a major 
challenge are: 
80% more likely to prioritize travel demand model accuracy,  
47% more likely to prioritize transportation system safety,  
56% more likely to prioritize transportation system reliability,  
37% more likely to prioritize transportation system accessibility,  
73% more likely to prioritize satisfaction among the general public,  
76% more likely to prioritize extent of coordination and stakeholder 
involvement,  
35% more likely to prioritize the measure of public participation,  
49% more likely to prioritize the level of highway congestion,  
74% more likely to prioritize air quality, and  
35% more likely to prioritize the condition of the transportation network as 
performance measures 
MPOs that rank competing 
priorities as a major 
challenge are: 
25% less likely to prioritize transportation system safety,  
28% less likely to prioritize transportation system reliability,  
25% less likely to prioritize transportation system accessibility,  
29% less likely to prioritize satisfaction among the general public as 
performance measures. 
MPOs that listed 
coordination with state 
DOTs as a major challenge 
are: 
 
33% less likely to prioritize project implementation,  
36% less likely to prioritize travel demand model accuracy,  
35% less likely to prioritize transportation system safety,  
34% less likely to prioritize transportation system reliability,  
24% less likely to prioritize transportation system accessibility,  
35% less likely to prioritize compliance with federal and state rules, and  
24% less likely to prioritize level of highway congestion as performance 
measures  
MPOs that listed shortage 
of trained staff as a major 
challenge are:  
 
43% less likely to prioritize project implementation,  
35% less likely to prioritize extent of coordination and stakeholder 
involvement,  
44% less likely to prioritize level of highway congestion, and  
32% less likely to prioritize both travel demand model accuracy and 
transportation system reliability as performance measures  
 
Overall, an MPO’s collaborative capacity, contextual complexity, size, and capacity challenges 
all appear to exert influence over the prioritization of performance measures. Given these 
variations, we recommend that federal government agencies, such as the Federal Highway 
Administration (FHWA), Department of Transportation (DOT), or others, do not attempt to 
impose uniform performance measures across the spectrum of MPOs. Instead, it may be 
practical to generate weighting schemes on performance measures to fit MPOs of different 
sizes and capacities. Another implication of the research presented here is that MPOs have a 
real need for improved capacity to better able the use of performance measures in network 
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contexts. Additionally, given the important and beneficial ramifications of collaboration, our 
research suggests that it would be prudent to investigate in more detail how to develop 
collaborative capacity in particular as an avenue toward improved performance management.  
 
5. Paper: Integrating Sustainability with Transportation Asset Management Processes: 
Governance of Intergovernmental Decision-Making on Prioritizing Transportation 
Projects 
 
This paper is under review at the journal Public Works Management and Policy. Asim Zia, Chris 




The research presented in this paper evaluates the decision-making processes of state and 
regional transportation agencies regarding project prioritization. As transportation agencies are 
faced with an abundance of potential projects and limited funds with which to complete those 
projects, they are forced to select only a small subset. This paper employs the state of Vermont 
as a case study and examines the processes through which projects are prioritized for inclusion 
in the Statewide Transportation Improvement Program (STIP). STIPs are federally mandated 
documents produced by all states and are essentially to-do lists of projects.  
 
Different agencies employ many different sets of criteria and prioritization schemes to 
appropriately select projects. Many rely to at least some degree on asset management systems, 
which typically assess the economic trade-offs between investing in different projects. Presently, 
most asset management systems and/or programs skew toward prioritizing projects that 
preserve the current transportation system. Additionally, a tendency to focus on economic 
efficiency has led to some concerns over the consideration of other important factors, such as 
environmental sustainability. “Stovepiping,” or a lack of horizontal overlap between projects o 
project phases, is another concern 
 
Here, we assess the following two hypotheses: first, the criterion of “system preservation” is a 
dominating factor in the selection of projects, and second, environmental sustainability-related 
criteria are under-emphasized in the selection of projects. To test these hypotheses, we 
statistically model prioritization processes for a 5-year period in Vermont and evaluate the 





5.3.1 Qualitative research and process mapping 
 
Our research was informed by focus groups, interviews, and analysis of prioritization data from 
both the Chittenden Country MPO (CCMPO, which is alternately referred to as CCRPC in other 
papers covered in this report) and the Vermont Agency of Transportation (VTrans). Our focus 
groups and interviews were conducted in the fall of 2010 with multiple stakeholders, including 
local government officials, CCMPO staff and board members, VTrans officials, FHWA and 
USDOT officials, federal and state senate office representatives, and local NGOs. The resultant 
18 
information enabled us to develop a schematic representation of the prioritization process with 
its many actors and steps, as seen in Figure 3.  
 
 Figure 3. Prioritization relationships in Vermont 
 
As shown in Figure 3, projects either initiate at the community level or are identified by 
agencies, and a subset of those projects are accepted as “legitimate” by VTrans. If they are in 
Chittenden County and fall under CCMPO jurisdiction, they are evaluated by CCMPO staff, who 
assign a score to each project based on the following criteria: economic vitality; safety and 
security; accessibility, mobility and connectivity; environment, energy and quality of life; 
preservation of existing system; efficient system management; and TIP status. CCMPO’s 
Transportation Advisory Committee (TAC) accepts or modifies the scores before passing them 
along to the board. After reaching consensus on the scoring, CCMPO subjects a project list to 
VTrans (this is called a Transportation Improvement Program, or TIP, which is similar to a 
localized STIP). VTrans incorporates these projects into the STIP along with the projects 
selected from other regions.  
 
5.3.2 CCMPO prioritization 
 
Both VTrans and CCMPO categorize transportation projects into six classes: (1) roadways; (2) 
traffic operations; (3) paving; (4) park & ride; (5) bridge; and (6) bicycle/pedestrian. Due to data 
limitations at the time this initial study was conducted, we were forced to limit our statistical 
analysis to roadways and traffic operations listed in the CCMPO TIPs and VTrans STIPs from 
2006-2010, but the study could be extended to the other classes as well. It could also be 
extended to more states.  
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For each project class, CCMPO calculates an expected value function (CCMPO_EV) for each 
project included on the TIP, as shown in Equation 1: 
CCMPO_EV (Projecti) = ∑j=1 wj.Xj  [Equation 1] 
 
Where there are i=1,2…N projects and j=1,2….M criteria. Each project is evaluated qualitatively 
on seven criteria (M=7), denoted by Xj on an ordinal scale from 1 to 10. All seven criteria are 
weighted equally:  
 
∑j=1 wj =70 and w1=w2=w3=w4=w5=w6=w7 
 
Table 5 shows descriptive statistics for CCMPO_EV, its natural log transformation 
(Ln_CCMPO), and seven criteria scores (Xj) from that were assigned to roadway projects. 
Standard errors are shown in brackets. The year 2007 see a higher number of projects and the 
mean expected value hovers between 46.08 ± 5.41 and 50.53 ± 6.20 out of a maximum score of 
70. Economic vitality as a criterion appears to receive consistently high scores, while system 
preservation appears to receive relatively low scores. 
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Likewise, Table 6 displays scoring for the Traffic Operations category of projects, which sees a 
much smaller number of overall projects in any given year.  
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CCMPO and the nine other RPCs send their ranking orders to VTrans. At the time of this study, 
VTrans assigns a 20% weight to regional priority, while the remaining 80% are derived from 
asset management systems and expert input. Equations 2 and 3 show the criteria breakdown 
and weights used by VTrans for generating VTrans_ExpectedValue (score) for roadway and 
traffic operation project classes, respectively: 
 
VTrans_EV (Roadway Projects) = (0.4)* Highway System Score + (0.2)* Cost Per 
Vehicle Mile + (0.2)* Regional Priority + (0.2) Project Momentum  [Equation 2] 
 
VTrans_EV (Traffic Operation Projects) = (0.4)* Intersection Capacity + (0.2)* Accident 
Rate + (0.2)* Costs per Intersection Volume + (0.2)* Regional Priority + (0.1) Project 
Momentum  [Equation 3].  
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The scoring structures used in both of these equations are derived from the VTrans asset 
management system and engineering economic analysis. Regional priority for each project 
class is derived from local rankings, as discussed above, and project momentum is assigned 
through qualitative observation. In 2009 and 2010, VTrans added a 10% weight for projects that 
were supporting the development of “designated downtowns.”  
 
5.3.3 VTrans prioritization 
 
Descriptive statistics for VTrans roadway and traffic operation project expected values can be 
found in Table 7 and Table 8, respectively.  
 


































































At the state level, VTrans prioritizes approximately 60 to 70 roadway projects per year. Traffic 
operation projects at the state level range from 14 to 21 per year. The VTrans expected value 
hovered between 48-50% of points for roadway projects and 48-54% of points for traffic 
operation projects. 
 





























































We found that only 40-50% of CCMPO ranked projects are included by VTrans in the same 
fiscal year. To gain further insight, we estimated a binomial regression model that used 
probability of project selection by VTrans as a binary dependent variable and CCMPO_EV as an 
independent variable. To test the effects of CCMPO scoring on environmental and system 
preservation criteria on the VTrans_EV we estimated log-linear regression models. These log-
linear models regress the natural log of VTrans_EV against CCMPO scores for each of the 
seven criteria.  
 
5.3 Results and Conclusions 
 
The binomial regression model results can be found in Table 9. Over the years examined, 
Vtrans selected 44.29% of CCMPO-prioritized roadway projects and 46.15% of traffic operation 
projects. The Nagelkerke R2 for roadway projects is slightly lower (5.1%) than for transportation 
projects (25.0%). A higher CCMPO_EV increases the probability of selection by VTrans for 
inclusion in the STIP by 5.9% for roadways and 15.8% for traffic oeprations. Overall higher 
CCMPO_EV tends to increase its inclusion in the STIP project prioritization process by VTrans; 
but this does not completely explain the variation in the observed data.  
  
Table 9. Predicting the Likelihood of VTrans Selection with a Logistic Regression Model: 



















Nagelkerke-R2 5.1% 25.0% 
% Correctly Predicted 62.9% 57.7% 
 
Next, we regress the natural log of VTrans_EV for the VTrans selected projectsagainst CCMPO 
criteria scores, testing whether projects ranked high on system preservation criterion or 
environment/sustainability criterion by CCMPO are also ranked high by the VTrans scores. The 
results of these regressions are presented in Table 10.     
 
Table 10. Predicting VTrans Prioritization from 2007-2010 Pooled Data with CCMPO Criteria: 















































Adjusted R2 67.1% 61.1% 
F-test 8.65*** 4.45** 
Note. Excluded# variables are constants or have missing correlations.  
*Significant at 90%; ** Significant at 95%; *** Significant at 99%.  
 
We estimate that both of the log-linear regression models presented in Table 10 have a 
relatively high Adjusted R2 at 67.1% and 61.1% for roadway and traffic operation projects, 
respectively. We find that higher scores on “system preservation” by CCMPO significantly raises 
the VTrans_EV by 7.3% for both roadway and traffic operation projects. In contrast, higher 
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scores on “environment, energy and quality of life” by CCMPO significantly decreases the 
VTrans_EV by 7.6% for roadway projects. This effect is not significant for traffic operation 
projects, probably due to their low adverse environmental effects across the board (for which 
reason the variable is excluded from the model). These findings confirm our hypotheses for the 
roadway projects. 
 
We also find that projects ranked high on “accessibility, mobility and connectivity” are likely to 
increase VTrans_EV by 11.3% for roadway projects. Surprisingly, we find that the roadway 
projects that scored high on “economic vitality” by CCMPO significantly reduce the VTrans_EV 
by (15.5%). Similarly, for traffic operation projects, we find that the projects scored high on 
“safety and security” are likely to reduce VTrans_EV by 8.4% of points (significant effect at 
p<0.05). Both of these unexpected findings require additional research to aid in explaining the 
observed phenomena. 
 
In conclusion, we found “system preservation” to have a statistically significant effect on asset 
management system-generated project prioritization scores in the state of Vermont. To the 
contrary, projects that CCMPO scores better on environmental sustainability are under-
prioritized by VTrans’ asset management system generated scores. These findings point to the 
need to modify the governance of intergovernmental decision-making processes for prioritizing 
transport projects; at present, sustainability considerations are not seriously integrated with 
transport asset management and investment decision-making processes. We recommend that 
the scores generated from the state asset management systems explicitly incorporate and 
weigh the criteria of environmental and social impacts of transportation projects. This would 
enable future asset management systems to appropriately integrate a broader spectrum of 
























6. Paper: Scale and Intensity of Collaboration as Determinants of Performance 
Management Gap in Polycentric Governance Networks: Evidence from a National Survey 
of MPOs 
 
This paper is slated for publication following final edits for a special edition of the journal Politics 




Many multi-level public-public and public-private inter-organizational partnerships are 
characterized as “governance networks.” Presently, more work is needed to understand how 
performance management systems are institutionalized within governance networks. Given the 
tendency toward distributed power and the presence of multiple actors, performance 
management systems and larger accountability regimes face unique challenges in the frame of 
governance networks. The scale of a governance network, both in terms of its jurisdictional 
reach and its level of collaboration, plays a unique role in performance assessment.   
 
Performance measurement is a difficult task across many sectors; it becomes more complicated 
when networks span sectors and levels. Measuring performance often involves data collection 
and analysis, then typically some sort of process by which that analysis is incorporated into 
future action. Assumptions shape which data are collected and how heavily different areas of 
performance are weighted relative to each other. We argue that too little attention is paid to the 
development of process measures, the distribution of authorities, and the collaborative and 
technical capacities found within multi-level governance networks.  
 
In this paper, we study the performance management issues faced by MPOs in the US. MPOs 
are often seated within multi-level, polycentric governance networks and therefore present a 
unique real-world context for the study of performance management. They have inter-modal 
transportation planning responsibilities that must be conducted according to varying time 
horizons. As such, their performance measures must not only capture conventional efficiency 
measures, but also broader social, economic, and environmental impacts of regional 
transportation planning choices. Many factors are at stake, including energy consumption, air 
quality, impact on natural resources, safety, neighborhood integrity, employment, and economic 
output. The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) requires MPO 
performance management systems to measures outcomes relative to environmental, economic, 
and social consequences.  
 
Our earlier research indicated that MPOs aggregate the preferences of local governments, 
particularly with respect to project prioritization, and transmit those preferences to state DOTs.  
Per federal legislation, MPO governing bodies must have elected or appointed representation 
from local governments, as well as representatives from regional FHWA and state DOTs. They 
typically have many other stakeholders involved in the governance process as well. Because 
they forge so many vertical and horizontal ties, MPOs have a unique capacity to collect, report 
and use performance measurement data. Whether performance measures are established 
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according to user or stakeholder demand or initiated as a top-down approach by MPOs may 
have influence over how accountability regimes are constructed and used. Interagency 
collaboration can be beneficial for accountability and performance management, so increased 
collaborative capacity at MPOs could have positive results. A variety of actors can not only 
collect and report performance measures, but also employ those measures to inform project 
prioritization and program implementation.  
 
This study examines how the size of an MPO and its ability to collaborate impact the collection 
and use of performance measurement data. Again, we use a 2009 Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) survey of all 381 MPOs to provide our primary data. Our study examines whether 
an MPO’s scale and intensity of collaboration across vertical (federal, state and local 
governments) and horizontal (regional planning commissions, businesses, citizen advocacy) 
stakeholder groups influences performance management gaps. We posit that the variability in 
how MPOs use and value performance data contributes to a “performance management gap.” 
We define the performance management gap as the statistical distance between the values 
ascribed to performance measures (normative performance measures) and the current 
practices for measuring performance (descriptive performance measures). We test two 
hypotheses:  
 
(1) Small scale MPOs have a significant performance management gap compared with 
large scale MPOs in the US; and 
(2) The performance management gap is inversely affected by the scale of MPOs as 
polycentric governance networks; that is, larger-scale MPOs with higher scale and 
intensity of collaboration have a smaller performance management gap. 
 
6.2 Methodologies 
The GAO survey asks MPO directors or their designees to respond to 45 questions regarding a 
variety of factors that shape an MPO’s structures and functioning. For this study, we focus on the 
set of questions that specifically relate to the MPO’s spatial scale, their scale and intensity of 
collaboration with other agencies and stakeholders, the operational challenges that MPOs face, 
and the performance management gap. Table 11 provides descriptive statistics for the variables 
that measure these constructs. 
Table 11. Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Symbol N Min Max Mean Standard 
Deviation 
SPATIAL SCALE       
TMA Urban (>200K)  SS1 327 0 1 .45 .498 
Multi-state area  SS2 327 0 1 .12 .328 
Located within an air quality non-attainment or 
maintenance area 
SS3 328 0 1 .50 .501 
Air Quality Non-Attainment Area and >200K SS1*SS3 327 .00 1.00 .3242 .4687 
SCALE & INTENSITY OF COLLABORATION       
FHWA Board Member SC1 328 0 1 .43 .495 
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FHWA Committee Member SC2 328 0 1 .55 .498 
FTA Board Member SC3 328 0 1 .32 .466 
FTA Committee Member SC4 328 0 1 .41 .492 
StDOT Board Member SC5 328 0 1 .79 .406 
StDOT Committee Member SC6 328 0 1 .76 .430 
State Env. Agency Board Member SC7 328 0 1 .16 .366 
State Env. Agency Committee Member SC8 328 0 1 .47 .500 
Transit Operator Board Member SC9 328 0 1 .59 .492 
Transit Operator Committee Member SC10 328 0 1 .76 .426 
Local Govt. Elected Board Member SC11 328 0 1 .95 .222 
Local Govt. Elected Committee Member SC12 328 0 1 .48 .500 
Local Govt. Non-elected Board Member SC13 328 0 1 .48 .501 
Local Govt. Non-elected Committee Member SC14 328 0 1 .78 .417 
Other Regional Authority Board Member SC15 328 0 1 .38 .487 
Other Regional Authority Committee Member SC16 328 0 1 .59 .493 
Environmental Advocacy Org. Board Member SC17 328 0 1 .05 .209 
Environmental Advocacy Org. Committee 
Member 
SC18 328 0 1 .34 .476 
Business Advisory Groups Board Member SC19 328 0 1 .13 .335 
Business Advisory Groups Committee Member SC20 328 0 1 .45 .499 
Citizen Participation Groups Board Member  SC21 328 0 1 .10 .305 
Citizen Participation Groups Committee Member SC22 328 0 1 .56 .497 
Private Sector Board Member SC23 328 0 1 .13 .338 
Private Sector Committee Member SC24 328 0 1 .48 .500 
Other Officials Board Member SC25 328 0 1 .19 .392 
Other Officials Committee Member SC26 328 0 1 .20 .402 
Intensity of Collaboration Index ICI 328 .00 100.00 44.7866 21.9686 
OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES       
Lack of funding CC1 326 .00 4.00 2.6840 1.1508 
Competing Priorities CC2 322 .00 4.00 1.9752 1.1731 
Obtaining public input CC3 321 .00 4.00 2.2991 1.0417 
Lack of flexibility CC4 317 .00 4.00 1.8486 1.2638 
Lack of ability to find local match CC5 324 .00 4.00 2.2006 1.3213 
Fiscal Constraints CC6 327 .00 4.00 2.5719 1.1378 
Limited authority CC7 312 .00 4.00 2.3942 1.0914 
Limitations in TDM Capacity CC8 317 .00 4.00 1.7634 1.0984 
Data limitations CC9 321 .00 4.00 2.0436 1.0237 
Coordination with land-use agencies CC10 321 .00 4.00 1.6168 1.0721 
Coordination with other regions CC11 311 .00 4.00 1.0161 .9348 
Coordination with state DOT CC12 326 .00 4.00 1.4448 1.1156 
Lack of trained staff CC13 322 .00 4.00 1.5497 1.1269 
PERFORMANCE MEASURE GAP       
Project Implementation  PMG1 306 -4.00 4.00 .6503 1.55509 
Travel Demand Model Accuracy  PMG2 287 -3.00 4.00 .9826 1.52016 
Transportation System Safety  PMG3 305 -4.00 4.00 .7115 1.39855 
Transportation System Reliability  PMG4 299 -4.00 4.00 .7926 1.44838 
Transportation System Accessibility  PMG5 301 -4.00 4.00 .7143 1.43228 
Transportation System Security PMG6 285 -4.00 4.00 .7333 1.50788 
Compliance with federal and state rules  PMG7 315 -3.00 4.00 -.1556 1.24073 
Satisfaction among local stakeholders  PMG8 306 -3.00 4.00 .1895 1.02590 
Satisfaction among general public  PMG9 308 -3.00 3.00 .4610 1.10747 
Extent of coordination and stakeholder PMG10 311 -3.00 4.00 .3312 1.12864 
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involvement  
Measure of public participation  PMG11 308 -4.00 4.00 .4708 1.27713 
Level of highway congestion  PMG12 300 -4.00 4.00 .4700 1.52869 
Air quality  PMG13 245 -4.00 4.00 .5224 1.97227 
Mobility for disadvantaged populations PMG14 301 -4.00 4.00 .6379 1.31089 
Condition of transportation network  PMG15 300 -4.00 4.00 .7433 1.44837 
 
6.2.1 Spatial Scale  
 
We consider three variables relative to spatial scale: 
 
Population (SS1): Per responses to Question #28 about population, MPOs for over 200,000 
were coded as having a large population; the rest were coded as having a small or medium-
sized. Of the respondents in this survey, 45% of MPOs are large and the remaining 55% are 
small or medium-sized.  
 
Area of Representation (SS2): Question #3 enabled us to code SS2 (whether the MPO 
represents a multi-state area). Of the sample (N=327), 12% represent multi-state areas. Multi-
state areas could complicate rules and governance.  
 
Air Quality Non-Attainment Area (SS3): Question #6 provided SS3: whether states are in air 
quality non-attainment areas. 50% of the MPOs are located in air quality non-attainment areas. 
We generated an interaction term between size (SS1) and air quality non-attainment (SS3): 
32.42% of MPOs in the sample are large (TMA>200K) and located in air quality non-attainment 
areas.   
 
6.2.2 Scale of Collaboration  
 
MPOs are required to collaborate with a variety of other institutional actors. MPO boards are 
often comprised of representatives from local governments, state DOTs, and federal agencies. 
One way to assess the scale of their external collaboration may be the measure the number of 
vertical and horizontal stakeholders on MPO’s governing boards and committees.  
 
Question #4 in the survey asked: “which of the following types of officials are members 
(including both voting and non-voting) of your MPO’s board…?”  Respondents were provided 
with a list of 12 stakeholder groups: FHWA, FTA, State DOT, State or local environmental 
agency, transit operator, local government (elected), local government (non-elected), other 
regional agency, environmental advocacy organizations, business advocacy groups, citizen 
participation groups, and private sector. A thirteenth category of “other stakeholders,” was 
asked as an open-ended question. Analysis of this open-ended question reveals that these 
“other stakeholders” are typically represented by local universities, port authorities, freight 
industry, FAA, US Air Force, school districts and airport authorities. The survey respondents 
were also asked which of the 13 stakeholder groups were represented on their technical 
advisory committees. We used their responses to measured 26 binary variables [SC1….SC26] 
regarding scale of collaboration across vertical and horizontal stakeholders.  
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6.2.3 Intensity of Collaboration Index (ICI) 
 
To measure intensity of collaboration we used Question #8, which asks, “how, if at all, does 
your MPO coordinate its planning activities with the following types of organizations?” 
Respondents received a list of 10 organizations: Federal DOT (FHWA and FTA), state DOT, city 
and county entities, adjacent MPOs, councils of government/regional council, regional transit 
operators, environmental agencies, air quality organizations, regional civic organizations, and 
advocacy groups. Respondents reported whether coordination took place through committee 
representation (to which we assigned a weight of 4), regular meetings (weight of 3), regular 
correspondence (weight of 2), solicitation of input/feedback on an ad-hoc basis (weight of 1) or 
does not coordinate (weight of 0). If an MPO coordinates with an organization type through all 
four coordination mechanisms, it will get an ICI score of 10, if none then 0. Since the 
respondents reported for 10 different organization types, each MPO’s ICI is measured on a 
scale from 0 to 100. The mean ICI is 44.78% points with a standard deviation of 21.96% points. 
 
6.2.4 Operational Challenges 
 
The survey asked respondents to indicate the extent to which their MPO faces specific 
operational challenges. Many of these challenges are common among networked organizations. 
We used Question #27 to measure operational challenges. It asks, “in your opinion, how much 
of a challenge, if any, do the following issues present for your MPO in carrying out the federal 
requirements for transportation planning?” and then lists 13 issues (variables CC1-CC13 in 
Table 11). Respondents assessed them on a likert scale: very great challenge (coded as 4), 
great challenge (3), moderate challenge (2), some or little challenge (1) and no challenge (0). 
Lack of funding appears to provide the greatest challenge, while coordination with other regions 
is the least challenging.  
 
6.2.5 Use and Valuation of Performance Measures and the Estimation of Performance 
Management Gaps 
 
The survey identified performance measures along the following parameters: the extent to 
which project implementation evaluations were conducted; travel demand models were used; 
the safety, accessibility and security of the regional transportation system; the level of 
compliance with federal and state rules; local stakeholder and general public satisfaction; the 
extent of coordination with stakeholders; measures of public participation; levels of traffic 
congestion; air quality and mobility for disadvantaged populations; and assessments of the 
condition of the regional transportation network.   
 
We attempt to assess both descriptive and normative performance measures. Question #37 
asked, “To what extent, if at all, does your MPO use the following indicators to evaluate its 
effectiveness?” Respondents were provided with a list of 15 performance measures and were 
asked to select one answer from “very great extent, great extent, moderate extent, some or little 
extent to no extent and no basis to judge”.  Question #38 asked, “Regardless of your individual 
answers to question 37, from your perspective, how useful, if at all, could the following 
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indicators be for evaluating the effectiveness of MPOs?” Respondents were provided with the 
same list of 15 performance measures and were asked to select an answer: very useful, useful, 
moderately useful, of some or little use, of no use, and no opinion or no basis to judge. Question 
#37 provides insight into descriptive measures (those actually used) and question #38 provides 
insight into normative measures (those desired to be used or presumed to be valuable). Figure 
3 illustrates the differences between descriptive and normative performance measures 
according to the survey responses (responses have been recoded on a binary scale; those with 




Figure 3. Descriptive vs. normative performance measures 
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In this paper, we define the performance management gap as the statistical distance between 
descriptive performance measures (those currently used) and normative performance measures 
(those ascribed high value). Figure 4, a box plot of performance management gap variables, 
shows that measures such as travel demand model accuracy are perceived to have a higher 
performance management gap, while variables such as satisfaction among local stakeholders 
have a smaller gap.  
 
 
Figure 4. Performance management gap variables (positive values represent a higher gap) 
 
We contacted several MPOs in Maine and Vermont and requested short interviews to help 
ground our findings. Rob Kenerson, director of the Bangor Area Comprehensive Transportation 
System (BACTS), and Tom Reinauer, director of the Kittery Area Comprehensive 
Transportation System (KACTS) provided what insight they could. Both MPOs are very small 
and cited funding limitations as a major contributor to the use and valuation of performance 
measures.  
 
To test our hypotheses, we estimated fifteen OLS regression models that use spatial scale, the 
scale and intensity of collaboration and operational challenges as independent variables to 
explain the variation in the performance management gap for each of the fifteen performance 
indicators.  
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6.3. Results and conclusions 
 
Table 12 illustrates our findings.  
 
Table 12. Results from OLS regression models. Standardized coefficients (effect sizes) with * 
shows significance with 10%; ** shows significance with 5% and *** shows significance with 1% 

















































































TMA Urban (>200K)  .129 .324** .127 .152 .095 
Multi-state area  .056 -.038 -.019 .022 -.068 
Located within an air quality non-attainment area .060 .245** .142 .135 .193* 
Air Quality Non-Attainment Area and >200K -.042 -.413** -.076 -.070 -.097 
FHWA Board Member -.172 .029 .094 .135 .051 
FHWA Committee Member -.074 -.052 -.163 -.095 -.176* 
FTA Board Member .248** -.061 .010 -.106 .002 
FTA Committee Member .090 .065 .166 .178* .171* 
StDOT Board Member .049 .078 .049 .014 .137 
StDOT Committee Member -.069 -.106 .133 -.070 .100 
State Env. Agency Board Member -.101 -.014 .025 .007 .030 
State Env. Agency Committee Member .080 -.170* .019 -.126 -.076 
Transit Operator Board Member -.077 -.125 -.086 -.076 -.089 
Transit Operator Committee Member .192* -.060 .091 .126 -.010 
Local Govt. Elected Board Member -.006 -.029 .027 -.004 -.008 
Local Govt. Elected Committee Member .029 .055 .031 -.017 .064 
Local Govt. Non-elected Board Member .040 .063 -.014 -.035 .040 
Local Govt. Non-elected Committee Member -.142 .054 -.035 -.001 .003 
Other Regional Authority Board Member -.054 .128* -.028 -.039 -.041 
Other Regional Authority Committee Member .040 .122 -.068 .030 .041 
Environmental Advocacy Org. Board Member -.058 .043 .024 .016 .103 
Environmental Advocacy Org. Committee Member -.027 .095 -.032 -.062 -.019 
Business Advisory Groups Board Member .026 .026 .021 .135 -.061 
Business Advisory Groups Committee Member .007 -.071 .052 -.086 -.068 
Citizen Participation Groups Board Member  .037 -.066 .051 .015 -.018 
Citizen Participation Groups Committee Member .003 -.030 -.054 .044 -.037 
Private Sector Board Member -.018 .006 .000 .032 .136 
Private Sector Committee Member -.170* -.117 -.053 .017 .005 
Other Officials Board Member -.007 -.117* -.020 -.072 -.032 
Other Officials Committee Member -.020 .160** -.034 .021 -.008 
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Intensity of Collaboration Index -.237*** -.204** -.211** -.190** -.224** 
Lack of funding -.061 -.047 -.121 -.185** -.088 
Competing Priorities -.042 -.109 .057 .124 .085 
Obtaining public input .019 .045 .007 -.059 -.042 
Lack of flexibility .007 .011 -.136 -.078 -.135 
Lack of ability to find local match -.019 -.007 -.007 -.130 -.150* 
Fiscal Constraints .102 .059 .055 .107 .140* 
Limited authority -.014 -.115 -.016 -.036 -.027 
Limitations in TDM Capacity -.271** -.104 -.173* -.190** -.139 
Data limitations .233 .097 .190* .063 .140 
Coordination with land-use agencies .004 -.031 .001 .138* .078 
Coordination with other regions .068 -.172** .013 .014 .007 
Coordination with state DOT .169** .193** .064 .102 .076 
Lack of trained staff -.035 .099 .037 .116 .085 
N 254 239 251 246 249 
R2 23.3% 27.1% 19.2% 24.7% 25.0% 
 
For the first hypothesis (that smaller MPOs have a bigger performance management gap than 
do larger MPOs), the evidence is mixed once we control for air quality, multistate areas, and 
other variables. To illustrate this, consider the measure “travel demand model accuracy.” Large 
MPOs located in air quality attainment areas have a statistically significant (p<0.05) higher 
performance management gap for travel demand model accuracy than small MPOs that are 
also in air quality attainment areas. But small MPOs in air quality non-attainment areas have a 
higher performance management gap for TDM accuracy than their larger counterparts. There 
continue to be unexpected results across several different variables.  
 
Regarding our second hypothesis (the performance management gap is inversely affected by 
the collaborative scale of MPOs), intensity of collaboration does appear to generally limit the 
performance management gap. The standardized coefficient for the intensity of collaboration 
index is statistically significant (p<0.05) for 11 out of 15 performance indicators. Two indicators 
are marginally significant (p<0.1).  
 
The implications of these findings are potentially significant: if MPOs aim to decrease their 
performance management gaps, one strategy could be to increase their intensity of 
collaboration with both vertical and horizontal stakeholders. Our limited qualitative research 
suggested that the small scale of their MPOs necessitates both vertical and horizontal 
collaboration to accomplish basic initiatives. Expectations, culture around performance, and 
standards-setting may play major roles in the presence and size of performance management 








7. Paper: Adapting Bridge Infrastructure to Climate Change in Vermont: Planning 
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Federal and state-level agencies are faced with the challenge of effectively employing data to 
inform planning processes in the face of climate change. Transportation agencies are being 
forced to consider methods of adaptation to the projected impacts, not just mitigation of those 
impacts. Se level rise, precipitation changes, and more extreme weather are just some of the 
impacts anticipated to affect transportation infrastructure. At present, transportation policies do 
not typically accomplish adaptation objectives. This paper uses Vermont as a case study and 
employs multiple methods to recommend policy alternatives that encourage adaptation.  
 
Although climate adaptation is a global concern, effects vary regionally and locally, meaning that 
approaches will likely need to be tailored to smaller scales. The US transportation governance 
structure is very hierarchical: federal, state, sometimes regional, and local agencies operate in a 
nested system. At present, local and state agencies are largely pursuing adaptation initiatives 
on their own. Vermont makes an interesting case study for its recent experiences with disaster 
and rebuilding.  
 
In August of 2011 Tropical Storm Irene caused an estimated $250 million of damage to 
transportation infrastructure in Vermont alone. Approximately 500 bridges and nearly 1,000 
culverts were damaged. The disaster spurred VTrans to formalize its stance on climate change 
adaptation; it released a white paper outlining opportunities and roadblocks alike. Federal 
funding bills have done little to address climate adaptation. Due to the disparate nature of the 
approaches being taken, additional research is needed to identify adaptation practices.  
 
This paper seeks to build on prior research and literature. It examines current practices, project 
prioritization procedures, and allocated funding trends in Vermont, then employs geospatial 
analysis to make recommendations. We seek to provide insight toward two research questions: 
first, are New England states undertaking planning and implementation practices to adapt 
transportation infrastructure, specifically bridge infrastructure, to the threats posed by climate 
change?  Second, which local jurisdictions’ bridge infrastructure is vulnerable to flooding risk in 
the face of climate change and should be targeted for bridge adaptation funding? The state of 
Maine is also discussed to provide context, but data limitations precluded a full comparative 




7.2.1 Interviews and qualitative research 
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The first stage relied on interviews to provide background information on existing adaptation 
practices. Eleven individuals from seven different organizations contributed insight either via 
phone or email. Online data mining and an extensive literature review also provided context.  
 
7.2.2 Project prioritization procedure assessment 
 
Next, state project prioritization procedures were assessed for the inclusion of adaptation-
specific components. These procedures tend to be publicly available, at least in large part, and 
can vary dramatically between MPOs and between states.  
 
7. 2.3 Funding allocation analysis 
 
Our research required the compilation funding data dating. We acquired from VTrans Vermont’s 
Capital Programs from 2000-2015. Maine’s Capital Programs provide little details; the best 
available funding plans were Statewide Transportation Improvement Programs (STIPs). Capital 
Programs are more representative of the budget, while STIPs are a plan for committing federal 
funds. In both plans, projects can fall behind, which can cause them to reappear in plans for 
several consecutive years even if they are inactive, which leads to data inaccuracies. Capital 
Programs are produced annually; STIPs are produced biennially. Using the Capital Programs 
and STIPs, we built a project database that included all available information about a given 
project. This research focuses solely on bridge and culvert projects.  
 
7.2.4 Geospatial analysis 
 
The fourth and final stage of research involved preliminary exploration with geospatial analysis. 
Due to limited data availability, this stage of analysis was conducted only for Vermont. Most 
data used is publicly available online through the Vermont Center for Geographic Information 
(VCGI); the only data not available there is the Vermont Bridge Funding Table noted earlier in 
this report. The bridge funding data was linked with geospatial data to map funding relative to 
other attributes. Steep slopes and high precipitation were used as proxy variables for risk and 
were mapped by town as well. To provide context regarding the risks relative to population, we 
also mapped income and population. Table 13 provides additional background on the data 
used.  
 









County, and Town 
Boundaries 
Polygon VCGI Various 2012 Names and spatial 
boundaries of RPCs, 
counties, and towns 
VTrans Bridge and 
Culvert Inventory 
Point VCGI/VTrans 1:5,000 & GPS 2014 Long and short 
structures: town 
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Raster VCGI/NRCS 800 meters 2008 Precipitation (inches) 
Vermont Town 
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7.3 Results and Conclusions 
 
7.3.1 Current practices 
 
VTrans is embarking on limited adaptation initiatives. Post-Irene Capital Programs do refer to 
resiliency and adaptation. Notably, a partnership with the Vermont Agency of Natural Resources 
(ANR) has led to changes in stream crossings: new structures must be built to at least bank full 
width. This mandate was established largely for the benefit of aquatic organisms but has had 
the effect of improving flow capacity in floods and storms. Anecdotal reports indicate that 
structures built to bank full width are much less likely to fail (N. Wark, VTrans, unpublished 
data). Maine, like Vermont, has width requirements for stream crossings. All Priority 1 roads 
must have crossings at least 1.2 times bank full width and smaller roads require permits for any 
crossings not built to bank full width (J. Gates, MaineDOT, unpublished data). Adaptation is not 
an explicit a part of Maine’s primary transportation planning documents: none of the terms 
“adaptation,” “resilience,” or “climate change” appear in the most recent STIP or work plan.  The 
political leadership in Maine has likely contributed to the state’s slow movement on adaptation. 
Recently, however, with the help of FHWA grant funding, MaineDOT began a vulnerability study 
to assess climate risks posed to transportation infrastructure.   
 
7.3.2 Project Prioritization Procedures  
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At the state DOT level, both Vermont and Maine fail to include adaptation-specific criteria.  
Vermont’s current project prioritization scheme assigns points quantitatively based on a 
project’s ability to meet certain criteria and is based on asset classes. VTrans does indeed 
direct funding explicitly toward bridges and list criteria, such as scour, that can be associated 
with resilience, but it does not explicitly mention adaptation or resilience. MaineDOT employs a 
less quantitative scheme. It divides roadways into five Highway Corridor Priority (HCP) classes 
and identifies three different customer service levels (CSLs): safety, condition, and service. 
Projects are given report card style grades, A-F. A group of experts makes the final choices 
based on these grades. This could be both positive and negative: while it allows for flexibility, it 
also allows for political interference. The criteria employed by MaineDOT do not explicitly 
incorporate adaptation components.  
 
7. 3.3 Funding allocations 
 
Figures 4a and 4b provide a snapshot of bridge and culvert funding allocations in Vermont and 
Maine from 2000-2015, derived from the new database. Note: the funding information presented 
here represents planned—not actual—spending.  
 
 
Figure 4a. Planned bridge spending in Vermont and Maine, 2000-2015 (standard deviation is 
































Figure 4b. Mean funding per bridge/culvert project in Vermont and Maine, 2000-2015 (standard 
deviation is 0.29 for Vermont, 0.50 for Maine) 
 
In general, the funding trend in Vermont is more consistent than in Maine, though neither have 
consistent mean per project funding. Absolute allocations in terms of total yearly funding have 
seen a steady increase in Vermont since 2010. The database used here is currently being used 
to build an agent based model to simulate the changes in the expected funding projections with 
and without adaptation to climate change scenarios, similar to the roadways model presented 
earlier in this report. Further research is needed to quantify the damages anticipated due to 
funding shortages in the coming decades. 
 
7.3.4. Geospatial analysis 
The geospatial analysis presented here is a preliminary foray into the research possibilities 
associated with linking funding data to spatial bridge data. Time and data constraints forced us 
to limit our analysis to Vermont; we have not ventured into Maine. In Vermont, the mean number 
of bridges in a town is just under 20 and the mean funding for state-level bridges over the 
fifteen-year period examined is $5,787,080 per town (the mean federal funding per town is 
$4,430,248). Precipitation and slope were also mapped to act as proxy variables for risk: the 
mean average annual precipitation for any given town is 46 inches and the mean terrain slope is 
8.1 degrees.  
 Figure 5 displays average annual precipitation levels in Vermont. Elevation and 



























Figure 5. Average annual precipitation in Vermont 
 
 
 Figure 6 shows both cumulative 15-year bridge funding and total bridge count, both by 
town. Several towns with at least a dozen state-level bridges have received no bridge funding 
since the year 2000, while many more have received $2.5 million or less. Towns with a high 




Figure 7. Cumulative bridge funding, 2000-2015, and total number of bridges, by town  
 
To assess vulnerability, we isolated towns with: higher than mean bridge counts, slope, and 
precipitation and lower than mean funding levels. We identified nine towns deemed to be most 
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vulnerable according to that basic assessment: Granville, Bridgewater, Plymouth, Wallingford, 
Ludlow, Manchester, Sunderland, Newfane, and Halifax. When evaluated for income, all nine 
towns had below-average incomes (mean annual wages being $28,617 statewide). Their 
populations, however, were also below average, indicating that bridge failures might be less 
disruptive than in more populous locations. Figure 8 identifies those towns.  
 
 
Figure 8. Towns suggested for adaptation funds 
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It should be noted that the mapping undertaken here is rudimentary: many additional factors 
would need to be assessed to provide a more accurate picture of risk. Traffic corridors, soil 
types, bridge age, river locations and flow patterns, and flooding history are just a few variables 
that could be important. Additionally, this analysis is limited to state-level bridges, but local 




Despite the increasing body of knowledge about the future impacts of climate change, 
transportation agencies in Vermont are undertaking only limited adaptation actions. The nearby 
state of Maine appears to be lagging as well, though additional research would be beneficial. 
State agencies and MPOs, with their unique ability to assess threats at the state level, are 
uniquely poised to undertake adaptation planning. Linking funding data with existing spatial data 
may provide a novel way to assess risk and target limited funds to the most vulnerable areas.  
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